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FROM TERRORISM TO NONVIOLENCE AND THE ISLAMIC PEACE PARADIGM: JIHAD, JUST WAR, PEACE AND ISLAMIC NONVIOLENCE[1]

Sezai Ozcelik

Abstract

Islamic contributions in the areas of peace, war, and nonviolence require to be revisited in post-September 11 world. With reinterpretation and redefinition of Islamic concepts of jihad (sacred struggle), sabr (patience), adl (justice), umma (community), sulha (reconciliation), hijra (exodus), diversity, and tolerance, this study attempts to contribute the Islamic understanding of war, peace, and nonviolence. Also, the story of Cain and Abel in the Qur'an shows an example for the nonviolent action together with other contemporary Islamic nonviolence actions such as Intifiada, Kosovo, and Abdul Ghaffir Khan in Afghanistan. This study will examine the just war, qital (fighting), jihad (sacred struggle), Islamic peace and nonviolence.

Introduction

Although the Western paradigm in peace studies has been based on modernization, secularization, democratization, and rational choice, we have witnessed a resurrection and revival of religious thoughts and actions in both conflict and peace studies. There have increasingly come more insights and practical lessons from religion and theological studies into peace studies and conflict resolution. Most scholars focus on the role of the religion in peace-building, reconciliation, and peace-making. Also, religious aspects, insights, and praxis of the conflict have increasingly played an important role in the understanding of the conflicts in post-Cold War world. In other words, religion has been a major contributor to war, bloodshed, hatred, and intolerance. Yet, religion has provided the values of empathy, nonviolence, sanctity of life, inferiority, and compassion.

With the introduction of the Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis, some scholars believe that civilizations-not individuals or states- become the most significant unit of analysis. They conclude that the international system will move towards the clash of civilizations. In this
analysis, Islamic civilization emerges as a potential threat to "Western interests, values, and power" in a New World order (Huntington, 1993, p.45). However, it is misleading to speak of an Islamic "civilization" as a monolithic and holistic force in international relations. It is important to emphasize that Islamic thought is based on unity as well as diversity that lead to different approaches and schools in Islamic social sciences.

The contemporary resurgence of Islamic social sciences has focused our attention on the traditions of peace, war, and nonviolence in Islamic political thought and culture. Unfortunately, the Islamic contributions to peace and conflict studies are not in proportion to Islam's potential as a source of nonviolent social change and as a force that could influence the behavior of states in the international system. In this paper, I would like to present Islam as a nonviolent and peaceful tradition of social change in international conflict.

This paper will examine the Islamic contributions in the areas of peace, war, nonviolence, and social change. My intention is to present the range of ideas that characterize both historical and contemporary Islamic thought in terms of peace, war and nonviolence, to show that there is a need for a reinterpretation and redefinition of the Islamic medieval theory and for the application of the Islamic concepts to contemporary events. Although the Islamic political thought has been used for undermining the state's sovereignty and accomplishing the violent social change by fundamentalists, the modernist school has challenged both traditionalists and fundamentalists in order to create more contemporary interpretations of the Islamic understanding of war, peace, and nonviolence.

There are myriad of questions about war and peace in Islamic thought and philosophy. How does an Islamic perspective on life help us interpret and respond to international conflict? What is the definition of "Islamic peace paradigm" and how is Islam related to nonviolence? What is the definition of *jihad*? Can *jihad* be explained as an act of nonviolence despite the fact that most of the Western world is convinced that *jihad* is a state of war, a holy war? Regardless of the nonviolent components, what is the place of violence in Islam? Can Islam be defined as a connecting force between the punishing God of Judaism and turn the other cheek mentality of Christianity? What are the methods that can be used in Islamic nonviolent struggle? How can the Islamic concepts such as *jihad (*sacred struggle*)*, *sabr* (patience), *adl* (justice), *umma* (community), *sulha* (reconciliation) and so on., contribute to the Islamic peace paradigm? What would be the contribution of Islam into the peace-building efforts within Muslim societies and globally?

In the first part of the paper, I will explain the Islamic peace paradigm with the emphasis on the Islamic understandings about peace, war, and nonviolence. I will first give a short history of Islam. Second, I will attempt to explain the Islamic conceptions of war, focusing on especially the idea of *jihad* (sacred struggle). In the next section, I will closely look at Islam as a religion of peace and nonviolence. I will focus on the Islamic concepts related to peace such as *sabr* (patience), *hijra* (exodus), diversity, and tolerance. The following section will examine how nonviolent action is the rule rather than exception in the Islamic peace paradigm and what the Islamic nonviolent movements are such as Abdul Ghaffir Khan in Afghanistan, *Intifada* in Palestine, and Kosovo National Movement during 1990s. This paper will support the idea that the nonviolence struggle is not only the primary tool for *jihad*, but also the essence of the Islamic faith. In the conclusion of this part, I will emphasize the importance role of peace and nonviolence in the Islamic ethics, tradition, and social science.

Overview

The word "Islam" derives from the Arabic word *salam* (to submit, peace) and is understood as the religion of peace. Islam is the youngest of the three great monotheistic faiths and is, probably, the fastest-growing one. It is the last of the Abrahamic religions which all stress the unity of God, social solidarity, and the dignity of man.

Islam came into existence as a religion in the city of Makka, Arabia, at the early part of the seventh century. It was conceived by Muhammad (Arabic, "praised) (570-632), the Prophet of Islam. In 610 A.D., Muhammad began preaching the *Qur'an*, the basic scripture of Islam. He was against the idol worshiping, and questioned the status of Makka. Because of this revolutionary message, he faced considerable opposition, persecution, and even violence. The opposition and oppression against the first Muslims in Mecca forced him to flee to Yatrib (later to be called Medina) in 622 A.D. This event became known as the *Hijra* (exodus or migration) and the first year in the Muslim calendar. In early Meccan period, the Qur'anic precepts focused on spiritual issues and mostly advocated nonviolent struggle against un-believers. On the other hand, after the *Hijra* (622 A.D.), all Qur'anic verses revealed are related to the first Islamic state and political community (*umma*) and the establishment of Islam through violent struggle against hostile tribes in Arabia peninsula. With the growing of the Muslim community (*umma*) in Medina, the Prophet fought three decisive battles-*Badr*, Uhud, and Hunayn. In 630, he conquered Mecca and he died in 632. After his death, the four *khalifah*s (or successors of the Prophet) in Medina ruled between 634 and 661. The first four *khalifah*s are: Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali. In this period, the Arabs and Muslims were ruling from Iran to Egypt. Because of a failed arbitration between Ali and the Umayyad dynasty, a political break in Islamic history occurred, and the *Shia*s, the followers of Ali, was emerged in 661. During the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasty, Islam expanded from China to Spain. In the Ottoman period, Islam found some roots in Europe, and the Muslims became an important force in world history (Salmi, et.al., 1998).

Islamic Conceptions of War and *Jihad (Sacred Struggle)*

There are two essential sources for any debate about Islamic war and peace, the *Qur'an* and the *Hadith* (the sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad). Together they provide the sources for the Islamic *Shari'a* (the constitution of Islam). Basically, quotations from the *Qur'an* serve as the point of departure for discussions of Islamic war and peace. The common foundations for all Islamic concepts of war and peace are based on the traditionalists' interpretations and discourse. All Islamic scholars believe that the *Qur'an* and the *Hadith* are open to interpretation (*tafsir*) and re-interpretation (*ijtihad* and *qiyas*). The classical schools of Islamic thought mostly deal with the legalistic and judicial issues. In Sunni Islam, there are two principles of the Islamic traditionalists: the literal interpretation of the *Qur'an* and predeterminism. In contrary to the traditionalists, the modernists and

fundamentalists resort to the instruments of the earliest Muslim jurists: *ijtihad* (legal judgement based on human reasoning), *qiyas* (legal interpretation based on analogy), *ijma* (consensus of the jurists), the principles of equity and public interest (*maslaha*). Also, the modernists believe that human beings have moral responsibility for his/her own fate.

Although there is only a doctrinal division between the Sunnis and Shias, this paper will focus on the Sunni tradition of the Islamic ethics for war, peace, and nonviolence. Also, it should be emphasized that the conceptualization of the Islamic concepts is just a theoretical construct and is not reflected in the actual real life situation. Many works of the Islamic scholars should be studied in the context of their time and space.

The *Qur'an* contains some general provisions on the initiation of hostilities, the grounds for war, conduct of war, the termination of war, and the general nature of treaties. These also created the foundations of Islamic international law (*siyar*) (Hashmi, 1998, p.221). According the traditionalist scholars, the world was separated into two spheres: the land or abode of Islam (*dar al-Islam*) and the land or abode of war (*dar-al harb*). Dar-al Islam covered any territory where Islamic law was held and where the lives of Muslims were secure. It could also have referred to any country ruled by a Muslim. Non-Muslims were under the protection of the Muslim state. They should have submitted Islam either by conversion or by accepting the status of a religion minority (*dhimmi*). If they were the People of the Book-Christians, Jews, Sabeans, and Zoroastrians- (e*hl al-kitab*), they can have lived peacefully unless if they didn't accept the Muslim rule and the payment of poll tax (*jizya*). Idolaters were not tolerated in theory, but in practice they lived peacefully. *Dar-al harb* was territory not under Muslim rule. Theoretically, *dar-al Islam* and *dar-al harb* were constantly in a state of war and there was no peace between them. (Ibid, p.l221, Salmi, et.al., 1998, pp.72-73). Today, some scholars introduce another term, the land of neutrality (*dar al-sulh* or *dar al-hiyad*) where there is a secular state that is not inimical to Islam and does not persecute the Muslims. *Dar al-sulh* refers to the territories where there is no Islamic governance, but where there is a state of peace between the two domains based on treaties, alliances, and cooperation. Also, this situation is permitted when Muslim power is weak and a "temporary peace" (*hudna*) is preferred. (Tibi, 1996, p.130, Muqtedar Khan, 1997, p.182, Salmi, et.al., 1998, p.74).

The just war tradition in the West distinguishes between two notions: the justification of the war as a last resort (*jus in bellum*), and the limitations of the conduct of the war (*jus in bello*). The *jus in bellum* requires a right authority to initiate force, a justifying cause, and a right intention toward the enemy. The *jus in bello* set limits on who might legitimately be attacked (the idea of noncombatant immunity) and the means that could be legitimately employed (the principle of proportionality) (Johnson, 1997, p.43).

The Western notion of the just war (*jus in bellum* and *jus in bello*) can be applied to Islamic notions of *jihad* (sacred struggle) and *qital* (fighting). The word "*jihad*" appears thirty-six times in the *Qur'an*, whereas the term *qital* refers to the practice of warfare. There are four types of *jihad*: *jihad* with the heart (faith), the tongue (speech), the hand (good deeds), and the sword (holy war). For

traditionalists, *jihad* is a sacred struggle to establish an Islamic rule by means other than self-discipline, persuasion, and example. They believe that *jihad* as a defensive military action is a collective duty of the Muslim community and *jihad* can be carried out by the *khalifah* or *imam*, the religious and political leader of the Islamic community. The *Khalifah* or *imam* should decide when to initiate such fighting, when to avoid it, and when to bring it to an end (Ibid, p.62). Also, some traditionalists claim that any war against unbelievers is morally justified. In Islamic sense, when the Muslims wage a war for the dissemination of Islam, it is a just war (*futuhat*, the opening of the world through the use of force); when non-Muslims attack Muslims, it is an unjust war (*idwan*) (Tibi, 1996, p.131).

The traditionalists distinguish four types of war. The first type is called "illegitimate wars" that consist of squirmehes between rival families or neighboring tribes and the desire for plunder among "savage peoples". The legitimate wars have two types: *jihad* and wars to suppress internal rebellion. The *jihad* has two components. The first is literal war, fighting or battle (*qital*), which is a last resort for the small *jihad* (armed *jihad*). Second, it is metaphorical: war as a permanent condition between the Muslims and non-believers. The *Qur'an* distinguishes between defensive war (small *jihad* or *qital*), and aggressive and offensive war (*idwan*). The *Qur'an* specifically forbids aggression, but it orders fight against aggressors: "Fight for the sake of Allah (God) against those who fight against you but do not be violent because Allah does not love aggressors" (2:190) (Ibid, p.131).

As another classification, scholars make an effort to distinguish between wars in terms of motivations and objectives as good and bad wars. The 'good' wars have the purposes of conquest called as *futuh*, "openings" (that is, God helped the believers 'open' or conquer a given territory for the imposition of divine law and Islamic rule). On the other hand, the 'bad' wars called "*fitan*, "temptations" that can create the instability in Islamic community (*umma*), obscure solidarity among Muslims, and destroy the Islamic rule in a Muslim state.

In summary, the classical traditionalists are in agreement that fighting or waging war is permissible when there is a threat to the *umma,* and when the hostilities were directed against polytheists, idolaters, and the "enemies of Islam". This kind of *jihad* or *qital* is defined as "defensive struggle or *jihad*", that is, as war undertaken strictly to safeguard Muslim lives and property from external aggression. Thus, the Muslims may wage war for self-defense. On the other hand, war between the Muslim parties is classified a separate category: *fitna*. Because intra-Muslim conflicts are viewed as internal strife, they should be resolved quickly by the ruling authorities. Therefore, the Islamic arbitration (*tahkim*) has played an important role during the Islamic history to solve intra- as well as inter-Muslim conflicts. But, some scholars believe that the armed struggle and fighting is permissible if there are Muslims who are apostates, dissenters, rebels, and simple bandits, and so on, who deny Islamic faith and disturb the *Pax Islamica* (Johnson, 1997, p.67).

On the other hand, some scholars believe that *jihad* is equalivant of the just war in the West. The term *jihad* is used for the reasons of the assassination of Anwar al-Sadat, the war against Israel, the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, the war in Afghanistan, the Bosnian War, and so on. For example, in the Gulf War Iraqi

Leader Saddam Hussein termed the struggle a *jihad* against the forces of the West, while the Saudi *ulama* (assembly of clergy) declared a *jihad* against Saddam. Therefore, the explanation and understanding of the Islamic concepts may be helpful to bring peace, stability and justice to deep-rooted and protracted conflicts in the Islamic world. In short, there are four requirements for the use of force in the quest for peace in Islam (Kelsay, 1993, p.35):

1. There must be just cause;
2. An invitation/declaration of Muslim intentions;
3. There is a requirement of right authority;
4. The war must be conducted in accordance with Islamic values.

The modernist approach basically rejects the traditionalist interpretations of the Islamic concepts about war and peace and emphasizes the reinterpretations of these concepts in terms of non-violence and peaceful resolution of the conflicts. For example, Fazlur Rahman argues that the Qur'anic message should not be seen as a series of legal pronouncements, but as a moral code on which a legal system can be constructed. He rejects the idea that the *Qur'an* is a lawbook and sees it as the religious source of the law (Rahman, 1980, p.47). Similarly, the Islamic revival can be observed among the fundamentalist thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb, Abu al-Ala Mahdudi, and Hassan Al-Banna. They are concerned about the malaise afflicting Islamic civilization. Like the modernists, they also see *ijtihad* as a necessary instrument for rethinking Islam. However, they conclude that their reinterpretation aims not to generate a moral code or an ethical framework, but to confirm the divine law and the "authentic" message of the *Qur'an*.

The modernists point out that the term *dar al-harb* is not mentioned in the *Qur'an* and the categorization of the world into the two spheres have no Qur'anic basis. They believe that this theory is only the reflection of the historical circumstances in medieval time and it cannot be applied in modern times (al-Ghunaimi, 1968, p.104). On the other hand, the fundamentalists introduce a new term: *dar al-nifaq* (the land of hypocrisy). They argue that *dar al-harb* is a state which active oppression, corruption, and injustice are found even in a Muslim state. Because the *Shari'a* is today enforced in only a few Muslim states and Muslim rulers have allied themselves with the West, there has been a revolutionary struggle going on between the powerful and the oppressed people within the Islamic community (*umma*). Therefore, there is a need for armed *jihad* against the Muslim rulers and the West. (Hashmi, 1998, p.227).

Today there are two contrary positions on the Islamic notions of war and peace among the modernists and fundamentalists. As a representative of the modernist school, the Sunni Islamic scholars, especially al-Azhar University, produce the notion of *jihad* that discourages the use of force and emphasizes the non-violent means for conflict resolution in the realist international system. In contrast to this peaceful interpretation of Islamic war and peace, Islamic fundamentalists have focused on the armed *jihad* in the *dar al-Islam* and the *dar al-harb* environment.

According to the Al-Azhar interpretation, there are different kinds of *jihad*. They distinguish "armed *jihad*" or "low *jihad*" (*al-masallah*) from the high *jihad* that means everyday *jihad* against ignorance, *jihad* against poverty, *jihad* against illness and disease...The search for knowledge is the highest level of *jihad*. Therefore, the call to Islam (*dawa*) can be pursued without fighting (*qital*). Earlier Meccan verses are quoted again and again in an effort to separate the call to Islam (*dawa*) from any notion of *qital* or armed *jihad*. In the *Qur'an*: "Had Allah (God) wanted, all people of the earth would have believed in Him, would you then dare to force faith upon them? (10:99). The modernist scholars believe that in the modern age, communication networks offer a much better mean than armed conflicts for the pursuit of the *dawa*. Also, they support the idea of creating treaties between Muslims and non-Muslims. For example, they took the Treaty of Hudaybiya between the Prophet Muhammad and the *Quraysh* tribe as a model for the contemporary issues. They conclude from this precedence that an armistice (*hudna*) can be valid for a period of no more than ten years between the Muslims and non-Muslims.

Unlike the modernists, the fundamentalists are inclined to the use Islamic texts in support of their view about *jihad*. For example, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Banna concludes that the *jihad* is an "obligation of every Muslim" (Tibi, 1996, p.137). For them, *Jihad* and *qital* both have same meaning: 'the use of force'. It can be pursued against existing regimes as a resistance or against unbelievers as a waging war. In contrast to traditionalists, who distinguish between the use of force for just cause and wars of aggression or unjust wars (*idwan*), fundamentalists apply the word *jihad* indiscriminately to any use of force, whether against unbelievers or against Muslims who use their power for the oppression and injustice. They quote verses from the *Qur'an* as: "Fighting is obligatory for you, much as you dislike it" (2:216). Or as, "If you should die or be slain in the cause of Allah, his mercy will surely be better than all the riches you amass" (3:158). Similarly, another fundamentalist authority, Sayyid Qutb, indicates that war against "unbelivers" is a religious duty for Muslims. For him, modernity is a new form of *jahilliyya* (the pre-Islamic age of ignorance). Therefore, there is a battle against the enemy of believers and the international society of ignorance (Ibid, p.139). It is clear that for fundamentalists, peace is possible only under the banner of Islam. Non-Muslims should be permitted to live only as members of protected minorities (*dhimmis*) under Islamic rule. In all other cases, war against unbelievers is a religious duty of Muslims. They quote the *Qur'an*: "Fight against the unbelievers in their entirety as they fight against you in your entirety" (9:36). Although, the fundamentalists share the view of traditionalists in that they see war as a last resort for the defense of Muslim lands, they also add offensive component to the armed *jihad*.

Jihad, like just war, is conceived as means to outline the legitimate reasons for war to reach peace. However, Islam sees the peaceful inter-societal relations by obeying the divine law. This divine law is propagated by peaceful means if possible or by violent means if necessary. No war is *jihad* unless it is undertaken with right intent and as a last resort and declared by right authority. Most Muslims today renounce to call the Islam by force and limit *jihad* to self-defense. Even some

scholars believe that nonviolent *jihad* is possible and necessary in the contemporary world.

Islamic Conceptions of Peace and Nonviolence

In Islamic tradition, it is hard to point out a solid picture of the concepts of war, peace, and nonviolence. The basic controversy is between the Qur'anic "verses of peace" and "verses of the sword". In the *Qur'an*: If they incline toward peace, incline toward it, and trust in God; verily. He alone is all-hearing, all-knowing" (8:61). However, in other part of the *Qur'an* we encounter the following precepts: "And so, when the sacred months are over, slay the polytheists wherever you find them, and take them captive, and besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every conceivably place" (9:5); and

> Fight against those who-despite having been given revelation before-do not believe in God nor in the last day, and do not consider forbidden that which God and His Messenger have forbidden, and do not follow the religion of truth, until they pay the *jizya* with willing hand, having been subdued. (9:29).

The *Qur'an* emphasizes that peace is a basic Islamic value. The value of peace manifest in the messages of the *Qur'an*. It treats peace a desired way as well as a value or reward for righteousness. The *Qur'an* describes Islam as the abode of peace: "And Allah summons to the abode of peace, and leads whom He wills to the straight path" (10:1). Indeed the world Islam, which means submission, is a derivative of the word salaam meaning peace. Islam is peace with God, peace with man, and peace with one's own self. Moreover, the Muslim greeting consists of the word *salaam* (peace). Muslims greet each other by wishing/praying for peace for each other- *Assalamu Alaykum*. (May Peace be upon you)! It is a practice based on the injunctions of the *Qur'an*. The *Qur'an* states that the greeting of those who are righteous and have been admitted to the heavens is "Peace!" (14:23).

There are other concepts in consonance with peace. For instance, the *Qur'an* attaches great importance to patience (*sabr*). Patience implies reaction, whereas impatience implies violent response. The word *sabr* (patience) exactly express the notion of nonviolence as it is understood in modern times. It has been pointed out that the incident of H*ijra* (exodus) was a nonviolent act to avoid conflict. The *Hijra* (exodus) is an example for the withdrawal and non-cooperation as protest and the practice for escaping from repression. Moreover, all of his life, the Prophet Muhammad never separated from the path of peace, and nonviolent struggle except when God (Allah) ordered him to engage in war in specific occasions- *Badr*, Uhud, and Hunayn. The *Qur'an* is a strong advocate of peace but permits Muslims to fight to protect their faith, their freedom, and their lands, and their property. After all means of peaceful change are pursued, violence is used as the last resort. The *Qur'an* forbids Muslims from initiating aggression or causing *fitna* (mischief, rioting), on earth and exhorts them to make peace with their enemies if they incline towards peace.

Second, the Islamic tradition connects peace with justice and peace should help the mankind to create justice in the world. Therefore, peace becomes a means to create a just social order. In this sense, justice is the goal of life and peace is the form of justice. The personal and collective struggle to build justice on earth is the essence of *jihad*. Therefore, the objective of war is not to propagate or spread Islam, nor is it to gain territory for the Islamic state. Rather, the war aims to establish and assure justice and to annihilate oppression and abolish tyranny. Peace in Islam mostly does not mean the absence of war, but the absence of oppression and tyranny. Islam considers the perpetual peace can only be attained when justice prevails. Islam, therefore, allows war against regimes that prevent people from choosing their ideals and practicing their beliefs (Safi, 1996, p.43).

Also, Islam stresses the importance of positive peace (the absence of structural violence). It is responsibility of the individuals as well as a state to provide the distributive justice and social welfare. This principle created one of the five "pillars of faith" in Islam. It is the duty of the Muslims to pay a tax on surplus wealth (*zakat*) to the society and the state for the improvement of the conditions of the poorest members in the society.

In the 23 year of prophethood, the Prophet spent the initial 13 years in Mecca. The Prophet fully adopted the way of active pacifism or nonviolence during this time. There were many such issues in Mecca at that time which could have developed into confrontation and violence. But, the Prophet Muhammad strictly limited his sphere to peaceful propagation of the word of God. This resulted in the call to Islam (*dawa*) that performed with the peaceful means. Even when in Mecca the *Quraysh* tribe leaders were set to wage war against the Prophet, he consciously selected the *Hijra* (exodus) to Medina instead of reaction and retaliation. H*ijra* (Migration) was a clear example of nonviolent activism. After the migration, his antagonists took the unilateral decision to wage war against him, God ordered him armed *jihad* and there were four bloody wars in Arabian Peninsula. Then, the Prophet still preferred the peace against war and he signed a peace treaty known as *Sulh al-Hudaybiya*, for ten years period and accepted all the conditions of his opponents (Wahiddudin Khan, 1997, p.3).

Following the *Hijra* (exodus) of the Islamic Prophet and his supporters in 622, the first Islamic community (*umma)* was established in Medina. The relations between this first Islamic state and the surrounding tribes have to be defined in terms of gradual nonviolence to violence. All Qur'anic verses revealed between 622 and 632 (the Medinan period) are the expression of the non-violent and/or violent struggle against the surrounding enemies. Thus, there are important differences in teachings on violence and nonviolence between the Meccan and Medinan parts of the *Qur'an* and Islamic history.

The Meccan period was totally based on nonviolent resistance and the virtues of patience (*sabr*), and steadfastness. In the Medinan period, Muslims established the first Islamic state and community (*umma*), and *jihad* moved from the nonviolent resistance to an armed struggle. During the Meccan period, the *Qur'an* has mostly dealt with the spiritual issues and ordered the *jihad* with heart and tongue. Also, during this period, the Prophet showed no inclination toward the use of force in any form, even for self-defense. He followed a policy described as

nonviolent resistance in spite of escalating physical attacks directed at his followers and at him personally. The Prophet insisted that the use of force was a last resort. He even ordered the most vulnerable Muslims to seek refuge in Abyssinia (Ethopia). In Meccan period, the Prophet's practice defined as active nonviolent resistance and open defiance of pagan persecution (Hashmi, 1996,p.153). In Medina, the *Qur'an* -rooted in its historical context- provided the precepts to *jihad* in the narrow meaning of *qital* as military fighting. Clearly, *jihad* in thirteen years period of the Prophet's life meant nonviolent resistance and there are many lessons to be learned from the Prophet's decisions during these years.

One of these lessons is about the conducting a war. This guidance that contains how Muslims are to conduct themselves in war, is similar to the Western concept: jus in bello. Because the goal of *jihad* is the call to Islam, not territorial conquest or plunder, the *Qur'an* and the Prophet provide the basis for *jus in bello*. *Jihad*, like just war, lists strict limitations on the conduct of war and demands that proportionality and discrimination are two main principles in Islamic conceptions of war. The principle of proportionality implies that inhumane weapons in the battlefield are restricted. The principle of discrimination suggests that the parties in a conflict should discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. To quote the *Qur'an*: "And fight God's cause against those who wage war against you, but do not transgress limits, for God loves not the transgressors" (2:190). Also, the first caliph, the successor of the Prophet, Abu Bakr enumerated the "ten commands" about the conduct of war:

> Do not act treacherously; do not act disloyally; do not act neglectfully. Do not mutilate, do not kill little children or old men, or women; do not cut off the heads of the palm-trees or burn them; do not cut down the fruit trees; do not slaughter a sheep or a cow or a camel, except for food. You will pass by people who devote their lives in cloisters; leave them and their devotion alone. You will come upon people who bring you platters in which are various sort of food; if you eat any of it, mention the name of God over it. (quoted from Hashmi, 1996,p.161).

The early traditionalist and juristic literature contains several examples of commands against killing women, children, and other non-combatants; similarly it hinders attacks on the enemy without first inviting them to embrace Islam, unintended affects and deaths against non-combatants (the modern term of collateral damage). Islam does not tolerate indiscriminate methods such as terrorism and the use of weapons of mass destruction. Nor it allows the destruction of God's creations- human lives, trees, animals, and the environment. For example, the use of napalm is unacceptable, as are explosions in department stores, hijacking, killing hostages in any means of transportation, and bombing civilian targets (Satha-Anand, 1990, p.31).

One of the Islamic ideas about peace is related to Islamic universalism and Muslim solidarity. Because the Muslims constitute a political community (*umma*), modernist thinkers suggest that there is some degree of transnational cooperation among Muslims. Although they accept the idea that there may be territorial states in international system, it is still be possible to create a "Muslim League of Nations"

that would be helpful to establish a peaceful co-existence between Islamic states. The existence of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) that consist of fifty states and other multinational Islamic organizations is an example of the Islamic universality and solidarity.

Another idea in Islamic tradition about peace is tolerance and diversity. Although Islam emphasizes the importance of the order, similarities, and solidarity within the Muslims, it also advocates diversity and tolerance. In the earlier Meccan verses, the question of faith was decided by the right of free choice: "To you your religion and to me mine." (109). Even though Muhammad failed to convert pagan Meccans, Jews and Christians into Islam, the following verses were sent: "If it had been your Lord's will, they would have all believed, all who are on earth. Will you then compel mankind against their will to believe?" (10:99). However, this attitude shifted towards more an intolerant and exclusivist discourse in the Medina period where the *Qur'an* gave permission to fight against non-Muslims, and even ordered not to take Jews and Christians (5:51) as allies or protectors. Some scholars argue that the Our'an emphasizes the separate character of the Muslim community and distinguishes pagan Meccans, Jews, and Christians in both the Meccan and Medinan period. But the Medinan chapters also contain verses about the toleration: "Let there be no compulsion in religion; truth stands out clear from error" (2:256). Also, the Prophet himself has worked to sow the seed of tolerance between Muslims and non-Muslims. In one instance, the Prophet Muhammad found some scrolls of the Torah among the things that the Muslims brought to him and he ordered that they should be returned to the Jews. In another instance, the Prophet was sitting when a Jewish funeral passed by. He stood up and his companions followed his example. He said: "Is it not a human soul? If you ever see a funeral, stand up." (Abu-Laila, 1991, p.66).

Nonviolence and Islam

Throughout the human history, violence has been seen as the only effective means of action in deep-rooted and protracted conflict situations. However, there is another unwritten side in human history and that is nonviolent technique of struggle. In his outstanding book, Gene Sharp indicates the basis of nonviolence: "It is the belief that the exercise of power depends on the consent of ruled who, by withdrawing the consent, can control and even destroy the power of their opponent. In other words, nonviolent action is a technique used to control, combat and destroy the opponent's power by nonviolent means of wielding power" (1973, p.4). Non-violence should never be confused with inaction or passivity. It is not inaction. It is action that is nonviolent. Non-violence is action in full sense of the word. It is a forceful action that does not use violence. It is a fact that non-violent activism is more powerful and effective than violent activism. When human beings are faced with problems, they resort to violence in order to solve it. However, it is better to solve the problem by peaceful means, avoiding violence, and confrontation.

Nonviolent techniques or nonviolent resistance includes public protest and persuasion, speeches, petitions, and symbolic acts; many forms of social, political, and economic non-cooperation or withdrawal and renunciation, such as refusal to

pay taxes or obey unjust laws, strikes, and boycotts to improve conditions or gain greater power; as well as intervention and the use of independent political institutions, or establishing 'parallel' organs of government. These means of struggle involve protest and persuasion, challenge and repression, strategy and discipline (Sharp, 1973, pp.117-445).

The religion of Islam seeks for social change and justice through nonviolent means if possible. It is believed that nonviolence is a norm and rule and violence is an exception in the Islamic peace paradigm. Satha-Anand claims that *jihad* is considered as the sixth pillar of Islam and it can be used against tyranny, oppression, and injustice with the nonviolent means (1993, p.9). Wahid believes that the unity of *umma* creates a sense of collectivity for the Islamic nonviolent action and promotes the solidarity against oppressors (1993). Islam also balances the unity of Islamic community with equality, common purpose, and brotherhood with the encouragement of the pluralism and tolerance.

Because of the Islam's commitment toward social and political justice through opposing injustice, corruption, and repression, Islam introduces the active nonviolence in its institutions and practices. For example, fasting can be used for both the implementations of the religious duty, and protest, boycott, and symbolic action (Crow, 1998, p.12). Also, the Friday prayer, the idea of the *umma*, and the *jihad* can be applied for communal purification, discipline and education in the nonviolent struggle. *Zakat* and *waqf* (charitable endowment) promote the social justice and positive peace. Moreover, the concepts of reconciliation (*sulha*), forgiveness (*afw*), and patience (*sabr*) are important elements in the Islamic religion and practice for the active exercise of nonviolence (Ibid, Ozcelik, 1998).

However, many Muslims criticize nonviolence as a foreign concept and believe that there is a lack of theological and cultural bases about nonviolence in Islamic tradition. One of the Muslim scholars who have taken a bold position about nonviolence in Islam is Jawdat Said. In his work about the two sons of Adam, Cain and Abel, shows us how God praised non-violent action. Cain, who wants to be accepted by the God rejected by Him, resorted to a death threat against his brother. While the other son, Abel was accepted by the God and he responded to the death threat by saying: "If you stretch out you hand against me to kill me, I shall not stretch out my hand against you to kill you" (*Qur'an*, 5:28). Then Cain killed him and lost the God's grace and mercy and became remorseful. This nonviolent peaceful stand on the part of Abel is similar to the idea in Christianity about turn the other cheek. This stance announces that human beings are capable of resisting violence by nonviolence, and of transforming a violent person into a remorseful one. Said points out that even self-defense is prohibited by the *Qur'an* and when people are faced with the aggressive hostility against them, they should behave like Abel, the son of Adam! The Prophet said his companion: "Be as the Son of Adam!" Said also concludes that this nonviolent strategy is not only a doctrine for the Prophet Muhammad, but also for the other Messenger. In other words, Said claims that the Prophetic paradigm -Abel's abnegation of violence in the face of Cain's murderous assault- is very important and asserts that even violence in self-defense is morally unjustifiable. (1998, pp.5-8).

Other scholars enumerate why nonviolent *jihad* (struggle) is necessary in Islam:

- Nonviolent resistance is a weapon against the status quo;
- Nonviolent political struggle is not pacifism, but active pacifism;
- It is more appropriate long-term solutions;
- It evokes sympathy and support for just causes;
- It is the surest way to build psychological strength;
- It is the weapon of the strong; not the weak;
- Oppressors fear nonviolent struggle more than violent resistance (Crow and Grant, 1990, pp.79-85).

The remarkable work of Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890-1988) presented an example for Islamic nonviolence. Although the Pathans faced executions, jail and persecution for years, they used *jihad* (sacred struggle) for peace. Abdul Ghaffar Khan was the leader of the Pathans (or Pashtuns) tribe in North India (today Afghanistan) and a Muslim follower of Mahatma Gandhi. He founded the *Khudai Khidmatgars* (Servants of God or Army of God), the world's first nonviolent army and led from 1929-1938 (Flinders, 1990, p.187). He challenged existing social and economic institutions, uplifted peasants, introduced women into political action, and fueled anti-colonial activity. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, later known as Badshah Khan, was a religious figure and was influenced by Gandhi's *satyagraha*, nonviolent civil resistance. He said: "[Nonviolence} was followed fourteen hundred years ago by the Prophet [Mohammed] all the time he was in Mecca... But we had so far forgotten it that when Gandhi placed it before us, we thought he was sponsoring a novel creed." (Easwaran, 1997, p.284). During the Indian independence movement, he and his followers have followed the nonviolence strategy. Badshah Khan shows us that three common myths are not true: (1) nonviolence is the weapon of the weak; (2) it works only against "civilized" adversaries; and (3) nonviolence is not part of Islam (Ibid, p.285). Mahatma Gandhi declared that he was able to perceive the origin of the doctrine of nonviolence and love for all living things not only in the sacred Hindu and Buddhist writings and the Bible, but also in the *Qur'an* (Doutgtherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1996, p.187).

Apart from this first modern nonviolent resistance example in Islam, there have been many cases in Muslim and Arab worlds: Egypt (1919-1922), Peshawar Pathan (Pashtun) Resistance (1930), Palestine General Strike (1936), Iraq Uprising (1948), Pattani Resistance in Thailand (1975), Iran Revolution (1978-1979), Golan Druze Resistance (1981-1982), Defense of *Al-Aqsa* Mosque-Jerusalem, Sudan Insurrection (1985), Palestinian nonviolent resistance-*Intifada* or "shaking off" (1987-89), Albanian National Movement in Kosovo (1989-1994). (Bennett, 1990, pp.41-57), Grant (1990, p.59), Biberaj, 1997, p.294).

In my view, two of the most important nonviolent cases are those in Palestine and the Kosovo National Movement, as such I will briefly provide an overview of these for further understanding. What I hope to establish is that Muslims do succeed in nonviolent ways for furthering their causes, contrary to misperceptions about Muslim nationalists.

Palestinian National Movement has a long and violent history, but it also held some nonviolent struggles in 1980s and 90s. Up until the end of 1987, the Movement had focused on military, economic, and diplomatic means to achieve its goals by their leadership in exile, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). With the end of the Cold War, it was hard to continue an armed struggle against Israel in the Occupied Territories. As a result, the Palestinians began to struggle with the only weapons available- nonviolent means and stones- in December 1987. At first, the resistance was spontaneous and included nonviolent strategies such stone-throwing children, strikes, protests, demonstrations, marching in the streets, chanting slogans, waving the illegal Palestinian flag, and so on. Afterwards, it became an official policy in the Movement and proved that the nonviolent struggle in the Middle East is more successful and effective than violent means. Some lessons about nonviolent struggle in the Occupied Territories are as follows (Crow and Grant, 1990, pp.85-88):

- All unjust systems are vulnerable to nonviolent struggle;
- Nonviolent resistance can bridge the gap between oppressors and the oppressed;
- Nonviolent struggle can educate the oppressor;
- Nonviolent struggle can overcome the "chosen people" doctrine;
- The concept of *jihad* can mean inner struggle;
- It can develop social and economic strength and international autonomy.

There was also another nonviolent political movement organized by the Muslim majority of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo during 1990s. The movement, led by prominent literary critic Ibrahim Rugova, emerged in response to the termination of self-government in Kosovo. Serbian government suspended Kosovo's autonomy and launched a policy of political, economic, and cultural marginalization of ethnic Albanians such as the closing of the Albanian-language university, TV, and newspapers. As a response to this nonviolent resistance created a state within a state. They established a Solidarity Fund for a private educational system in Albanian language. They also assisted people with financial needs because of political charges, and gave financial assistance to doctors and teachers from the Solidarity Fund. Rugova, the architect of the nonviolent resistance against Serbia, sees Kosovo struggle as a long-term process and stresses the importance of Albanian national institutions and self-confidence. In spite of the bloody violent resistance in 1999, he insisted that the use of nonviolent methods is necessary not to descent into the violence that has consumed Bosnia (Biberaj, 1997, p.295).

Conclusion

In sum, while the *Qur'an* does not prescribe an explicit ethic of nonviolence and peace, neither does it give higher value to actions of violence. In the *Qur'an*, there are no consistent or unequivocal general concepts for determining war, peace, and nonviolence. Each Qur'anic verse is related to some specific historical events.

Thus, there are Qur'anic verses that call for nonviolence, while others call for war. This is not a contradiction, but a reflection of specific historical situations. For example, where most Meccan verses focus on spiritual issues, after the *Hijra* (migration) to Medina the *Qur'an* moved gradually-rooted in historical context- to provide precepts to "armed *jihad*", in the more narrow sense of *qital* as military fighting. On the other hand, if we take the consideration of time-space dimension and gradual changes in Islamic tradition, it becomes clear that Islam tends to give moral precedence to nonviolence. One can even conclude that the pursuit of religiously oriented or informal struggle (*jihad*) in the modern world by the methods of nonviolent action is fully consistent with in Islamic scripture and tradition.

The *Qur'an* makes references to "war" (*harb*), fighting (*qital*), and, even more frequent references to "struggle or striving" (*jihad*) that sometimes means "armed struggle". In some passages, the words sometimes have symbolic meanings. The Qur'anic verses have an ambivalent attitude toward violence and peace. On the one hand, oppression of the weak is condemned, and some passages state clearly that the believers are to fight only in self-defense. But a number of passages seem to provide explicit justification for the use of force (war and fighting) to call for Islam (Donner, 1991, p.47). It is hard to decide whether the *Qur'an* promotes offensive war or just defensive war. But in modern times, many Muslim scholars believe that Islamic public interest is necessitated with only defensive action because of the weapons of mass destruction and the Islamic ethic of war (jus in bellum and jus in bello in Islamic tradition). In *Qur'an*, for example, "Those who disbelieve and divert (others) from the way of God, He will lead their works astray... So when you meet those who disbelieve (during a military campaign), smite the necks; so that when you have overcome them, you may set (them) in bondage. Afterwards (free them) either as a favor or for ransom until the war (*harb*) puts down its weapons" (47: 1-4). Some verses imply that the war should be defensive in nature, that is, in order to prevent oppression: "And fight in God's way against those who fight you, but do not act aggressively. Indeed God does not love those who act aggressively" (2:190). But the very next verse states: "And kill them wherever you overtake them, and drive them out from where they drove you out. For *fitna* (tempting people away from Islam) is worse than killing. But do not fight them at the Sacred Mosque, unless they fight you in it; but if they do fight you (in it), slay them. Such is the recompense of the unbelievers" (2:191). Therefore, many scholars accept that war and fighting are seen as a valid and necessary means in dealing with non-Muslims as a last resort to end oppression and injustice. But the *Qur'an* specifically prohibits any violent acts among Muslims and encourages the Islamic community to use non-violent and conflict resolution tools such as arbitration (*tahkim*), mediation (*wasata*), and reconciliation (*sulha*).

Although Islam is seen as a "religion of the sword" that is guided by conversion, coercion, and war in the Western media, the majority of the contemporary Muslim scholars and jurists restrict *jihad* only to a defensive act against outside attack toward Muslim nation-states and/or against internal subversion (Martin, 1991, p.108).

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Glossary

(For detailed glossary, look at Salmi, Ralph H., et.al., 1998)

Badr: the first full military confrontation between the Muslims and the enemies of Allah. The battle took place between the Muslims and the *Quraish* of Mecca in the second year of *Hijrah* (624 C.E.). Even though the Muslims were outnumbered, the final result was to their favor.

Dar-al ahd: Also referred to *dar al-sulh.* Term coined by the jurist to indicate non-Muslim territories involved in treaty agreements giving up sovereignty to a Muslim

state but maintaining local autonomy. Designed to extend Muslim jurisdiction with tributary payments related to land.

Dar-al Harb: Land or abode of war. Referred to as those regions or countries at war with Islam or not yet under Islamic control. it is the opposite of *dar al-Islam*.

Dar-al Islam: The opposite of *dar-al harb*. Abode of peace. The land of Islam or the House of Islam. Refers to lands under Islamic rule or sway. A region where Islamic rights are upheld or recognized.

Dar al-sulh or dar al-hiyad: Region not under Islamic control but considered at peace with Muslims. see also *dar al-ahd*. the land of neutrality

Dar al-nifaq: the land of hypocrisy

Dawa: Islamic preaching or missionary work among and for Muslims. It is not a proselytizing effort such as those seen in Christian sects such as Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, and certain Christian fundamentalist groups.

Dhimmi: A member of a non-Muslim group with whom a covenant of protection by Muslims has been entered into. He is exempt from duties of Islam like military and *zakah* but must instead pay a tax called *jizya*.

Ehl-al Kitab: the People of the Book-Christians, Jews, Sabeans, and Zoroastrians.

Futuh/Futuhat: the opening of the world through the use of force

Hadith: Narrative or narration. Refers to reports on the sayings and actions (deeds) of the Prophet Muhammad and recorded in the second century of the *hijra*. There are six standard Sunni collections of the *hadith* of the Prophet. Together with the *Qur'an*, it is a source of *Sharia*.

Hijra: Emigration, departure, or exodus. In Islam it refers to the first year of the Muslim calendar in which Muhammad left Makka for Medina. Subsequent dates became *Anno Hejirae* or A.H. with 1/1/1 *hijra* being calculated as July 16, 622 C.E. The word *hijra* means to leave a place to seek sanctuary or freedom from persecution or freedom of religion or any other purpose. *Hijra* can also mean to leave a bad way of life for a good or more righteous way.

Hudna: Temporary peace or armistice. The hudna is a truce agreement where the Jaha specifies a period of time, usually three to six months with the understanding that the offended family will not retaliate. Hudna is therefore considered an act of humility, demonstrating repentance and a willingness to make peace.

Idwan: Unjust war or aggression

Ijma: "Consensus". Refers to the consensus of the faith or, in effect, the consensus of the learned, that is the *ulama* as one of the sources of the *Sharia*.

Ijtihad: Effort or striving. It refers to individual exertion as a process in arriving at new interpretations or judgements in Islamic Law as opposed to blind adherence to tradition. It also refers to the legal judgement based on human reasoning. Sometimes divided into complete *ijtihad* (the ability of one to independently arrive at Allah's rulings in all areas of *fiqh*) and partial *ijtihad* (the ability of one to do so only in certain areas of *fiqh* in which they have exerted such efforts).

Imam: Prayer leader. Literally, "one who is in front." Any person who leads a congregational prayer is called an *Imam*. A religious leader who also leads his community in the political affairs may be called an Imam, an Amir, or a Caliph. Among *Shia*, the Imam is the necessary divinely guided, infallible, sinless political/religious leader.

Islam: Islam is an Arabic word the root of which is Silm and *Salam*. It means among others: peace, greeting, salutation, obedience, loyalty, allegiance, and submission to the will of the Creator of the Universe. Islam is the last and final religion to all mankind and to all generations irrespective of color, race, nationality, ethnic background, language, or social position. The religion of Islam is not to be confused with Mohammedanism. The latter is misnomer to Islam. Muslims do not accept this name as it gives wrong information about Islam and Muslims.

Jahilliyya: the "age of ignorance" or pre-Islamic Arabia. Contemporary usage, often pejorative, refers to certain practices of Arabs and other Muslims whose behavior resembles that of the pre-Islamic pagan practices in Arabia.

Jihad: From the verb *jahada*, to struggle. Effort or striving in God's path. When it refers to the individual effort to conquer himself or passions, it is called greater *jihad*. When it refers to the communal effort at a defensive war against the enemies of Islam, then it is called lesser *jihad*. A person who wages *jihad* is called a *mujahid*.

Jizya: A poll tax or "head tax" levied on *dhimmis* or non-Muslims living in Muslim lands. Since the non-Muslims are exempt from military service and taxes imposed on Muslims, they must pay this tax to compensate. It guarantees them security and protection. If the State cannot protect those who paid *jizya*, then the amount they paid is returned to them.

Kaabah: Name of sacred, cube-shaped building in Makka. Believed by Muslims to have been erected by Abraham and Ishmael. Muslims pray toward the *Kaabah*. It serves as a unifying focus among Muslims.

Khalifah: "Successor". Man as the vice regent (of God) on earth. Also, the individual (male) successor to the temporal duties of the Prophet Muhammad but without direct, divine revelation. The institution of the office or a state which acknowledges the sovereignty of God is a *Khalifah*. This person acts as the head of state for the Muslim *Umma*. Another title for the *Khalifah* (English *Caliph*) is *Amir Al-Mu'mineen* which means 'the leaders of the believers'. The immediate *Caliph*s were Abu Bakr As-Siddiq, Omar Ibn Al-Khattab, Othman Ibn 'Affan, and 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib. These were given the nickname of *Al-Khulafa'Ar-Rashidun* (The Guided *Caliph*s). Another use for this word is used for humanity in general. The human being is considered the Khalifah (representative) of Allah on earth according to Allah. Also transliterated as *caliph*, *khalif*.

Medina: the first city-state that came under the banner of Islam. It is where the Prophet's *masjid* and grave are situated.

Qiyas: Legal interpretation based on analogy. Process of juridical reasoning by use of analogy or syllogism. Is considered by Sunni schools as one of the sources of the *Sharia*. " *Qiyas* is a method for reaching a legal decision on the basis of evidence (a precedent) in which a common reason, or an effective cause, is applicable."

Qur'an: The holy book of Islam is called the *Qur'an*. It was revealed unto Muhammad (s.a.w) from Allah through angel Gabriel (Jibril) for a period of 23 years. There is only one *Qur'an* in the whole world and it is in Arabic language. The *Qur'an* has one text, one language, and one dialect. It has been memorized by millions of Muslims in different parts of the world. The *Qur'an* is composed of 114

Surah (chapters). It is to be read and recited with rules and regulations. When to be touched and to be recited, a Muslim to be in a state of cleanliness and purity.

Quraysh: Name of the major Makkan clan (sixth-seventh centuries) into which Muhammad was born. The *Quraysh* were the keepers of the Ka'bah and therefore one of the wealthiest and most powerful tribes. The Prophet was from among the *Quraysh*. When he started to preach the True religion of Allah, the *Quraysh* violently persecuted him and his followers. They were badly defeated at the battle of *Badr* by the Muslims and their days of *Jahiliyyah* were finally ended when the Muslims liberated Mecca and destroyed all the idols in the *Ka'bah* in the year 630 C.E.

Shari'a: "The Path of Way." It refers to the sacred law of Islam. To some Muslims it is restricted to what is explicitly provided for in the *Qur'an* and *hadith*. To most, it refers to the law as expounded by particular schools. The legislative power in the government lies in the hands of legislative assembly. The legislators are to make rules and regulations within the scope and dimensions of the *Qur'an* and the *Sunna* of the Prophet Muhammad. These rules constitute the *Shari'a*.

Shi'a: Adherents. That group of Muslims who split from the Islamic community over the issue of succession to the *Khalifah*. Believe the *khalifah* is hereditary and should have gone to Ali and his descendants.

Sulha: It is a practice of conflict management in the Arabic tradition with the emphasis on reconciliation and peacemaking.

Sunna: Habitual practice, customary procedure; usage sanctioned by tradition. More specifically, the sayings and actions or way of life of Muhammad, the Prophet.

Sunni: Follower of the tradition and the *sunna*. Often used to distinguish the Muslim majority, that is, those accept the four schools of law from the minority *Shi'i* school.

Tafsir: Interpretation. Commentary or exegesis of whole or part of the *Qur'an*.

Tahkim: the process of arbitration or the submission to arbitration. The arbitrator who settles a dispute is called *hakam*.

Ulama: The assembly of clergy. Plural form of '*alim*'.

Umma: The "community" of Islamic faithful. It is used in reference to the community of Believers or Muslims. Also used in modern sense of a "nation" or "people".

Wasata: It refers to both the act and the person who mediates or intercedes. In classical Arabic, *wasata* refers to the act (mediation); while *wasta* or *wasit* is the person who performs the act (mediator).

Zakat: (pl.) zakan, zakawat. Obligatory alms tax on all Muslims. One of the five pillars of Islam is *Zakah*, which means purification and increment of one's wealth. A religious tax payable by believers on certain categories of property and wealth and intended to assist the poor and needy, travelers, and debtors. It is to be used in eight categories for welfare of the society that are mentioned in the *Qur'an*, namely: the poor, the needy, the sympathizers, the captives, the deptors, the cause of Allah, the wayfarers, and for those who are to collect it. It is to be used in eight categories for welfare of the society that are mentioned in the *Qur'an*, namely: the poor, the needy, the sympathizers, the captives, the deptors, the cause of Allah, the wayfarers, and

for those who are to collect it. The amount to be collected is 2.5%, 5%, or 10%, depending on the assets and the method used to produce it. For example, it is 2.5% of the assets that have been owned over a year, 5% of the wheat when irrigated by the farmer, and 10% of the wheat that is irrigated by the rain. It is considered that the *zakat* "purifies" the remaining property and wealth of the one who pays it.

Endnote

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