Jihad and Just War Theory: Dissonance and Truth

By Charles W. Amjad-Ali

Abstract: The Christian tradition of just war does not have a New Testament foundation but is a tradition that developed after the conversion of Constantine and Christianity’s emergence as the state religion of the empire. In Islam, however, just war has been an issue since its foundational period, because while Christianity did not get involved in statecraft until Constantine, Islam dates its calendar literally from the establishment of the first statecraft in Medina. However, distortion of this tradition has occurred in both religions: we have a distorted justification of just war tradition in Christianity, and a distorted understanding of jihad as simply a holy war in Islam. This paper tries to deconstruct both these traditions and create a new hermeneutics for contemporary times.

Key Terms: Qur’an, just war tradition, holy war, jihad

Christian and Muslim Early History and the Roots of Just War Tradition

One of the major difficulties with the Christian just war tradition is that it has neither a scriptural premise—especially not a New Testament premise—nor any early theological roots, as it begins to emerge only in the middle of fourth century. Of necessity, therefore, Christian just war tradition is generated as an apologetic by Christian theological leaders to justify the state, particularly its power in terms of waging war and making a war moral. Such a necessity only emerged after the conversion of Constantine to Christianity. Previous to that time, war never could have been justified or defended as part of Christian tradition or doctrine by either the scriptural witnesses or the early church. Such a justification would have legitimized Christians’ own persecution and perhaps even the destruction of the Christian community by the legitimate authority of the Roman Empire. Hence, it takes the church well over 300 years to even imply some sort of just war concept as a part of its doctrinal, theological and ethical concern.

Islam, on the other hand, developed along a very different trajectory. Very early in its development, in the time of the Prophet Mohammad himself, Islam began the process of political rule, exercise of power, and even the exertion of political will and exercise of force; and the formation of a highly effective governance and expansion. Thus the just war theory in Islam has its roots much earlier in the tradition than Christianity. It must be remembered, too, that Islam had access to Mediterranean philosophy, ethics, and political discourse. This is especially true for the works of Plato and Aristotle, which largely had been lost to the church at this time. In fact, these works were brought back into Western Christianity through Islamic resources, coming to Paris and from there to Thomas Aquinas who crafted the most systematic just war theory to that point, based on Aristotelian principles.¹

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Islam also had access to the Zoroastrian world, and through them to the sources of state craft of one of the largest empires extending south and southeast to India.

All of this became relevant for Islam following the migration of the Prophet in 622 CE to Medina, after twelve years of heavy persecution in Mecca. He had been invited to Medina by the Medinese people to act almost as the head of that city-state, which he ruled from 622 to 632. He was followed by the four rightly guided Caliphs: Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali, who expanded the Islamic hegemony in the region. They captured the area as far as Egypt towards the west, and then moved eastward through Syria and Mesopotamia, capturing that wing of the Greco-Roman world, and part of the Zoroastrian empire.

In the four decades between the migration of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina and the establishment of the city state of Medina under his rule in 622, to the death of the last rightly guided Caliph, Ali, in 661, Muslims brought under their control a vast swath of land; they struck at the territorial holdings of the Hellenistic and Roman world on the one side, and the Zoroastrian on the other. By the time of the establishment of the first dynastic caliphate of the Umayyads in 661, the Islamic state was fully in place, and there was some serious theoretical work beginning to emerge concerning the sources of ethics, law, jurisprudence, and statecraft.

The Role of the Qur’an

For Muslims, the Qur’an is the direct word of God, revealed exclusively with God’s authorship and human penmanship. Therefore, the Qur’an is the main knowledge source for all aspects of life. Since the Qur’an already reflects the revelations of God to Muhammad while he was in the process of establishing the city-state of Medina, in which Jewish, Christian, pagans and what are called “hanifs” (monotheists outside the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition) all lived, the character of the state as well as the struggle against internal betrayal is very much present in the Qur’an. So too is the struggle with the Meccans, who continued to threaten the existence of the Medinese state, Muhammad and the Muslims, until the Meccan defeat at the hands of the Prophet’s forces in 632.

So for Islam, the concepts of war, battle, and conduct of war, among other things, are not some accretion that has to be theologically justified after well over 300 years of life of the faith, but rather they are central to the formation of Islamic theology, jurisprudence, and ethics, because they happen during the life of the Prophet and during the process of revelation itself. That this continues in the first generation of Muslims who had been part of this struggle with the Prophet, namely the caliphs mentioned above and others, makes for a very early formation and early groundwork on these issues.

Islam constantly refers to that early period as the normative period for the formation of the faith. This is its strength—but it also leads to a weakness and an inability to do a contemporary hermeneutics of these texts and sources, taking the contemporary history and situation into account, instead of simply applying in toto a theology, a jurisprudence, and an ethics that originated in particular historical, geographical, and political contexts. In this way, what is Islam’s strength—highly developed early sources for faithful living in political and social contexts—also becomes its weakness; and this is what is being exploited today by what we call the Jihadists/Radical Islamists. The latter should be actually referred to as Salafis. This Sunni tradition views the first three generations of Muslims, that is, Prophet Muhammad’s companions, and two succeeding generations after them, as examples of how Islam should be practiced. In other words, Salafis are those who demand that Islam must maintain a direct connection to the roots of the faith practices of the Muslim community in the first three generations. Key to this whole discussion, of course, is how Islam approaches the issue of jihad. After a discussion of the Christian just war tradition, I examine the literal, spiritual and political coercive usage of the word jihad by varying factions in Islam.
Theological and Doctrinal Difficulty with Christian Just War Tradition

The Christian concept of ‘just war’ comes to us from several sources; the genesis is usually located in Cicero (d. 43 BCE), whose ideas are then implicitly affirmed by Ambrose of Milan (d. 397 CE) and Augustine of Hippo (d. 430), who is considered the author of the concept of bellum justum (just war). The just war theory then goes through theological permutations by Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), Francisco de Vitoria (d. 1546), and Francisco Suarez (d. 1617); and then formally becomes part of the Lutheran confessional structure in the Augsburg Confession of 1530, the Thirty Nine Articles of the Anglicans in 1571, and the Westminster Confession of 1648. In this way, it has been a part of all the major denominational structures of the Western Church.

Since September 11, 2001, there has been a revival of the discussion of the just war theory by theologians, as well as political theorists, social philosophers, and the like. It also has surfaced as part of a critical evaluation of the U.S. wars in Afghanistan, which began in October 2001, and Iraq—a war launched after some very serious considerations, excuses, justifications and even falsehoods—in April 2003. Both these wars are still going on under the general rubric of the ‘War on Terrorism’, which could be seen as a third war in itself, since it entails our military and intelligence involvements on a much larger stage than the two specific wars mentioned above.

Among the many books that have been published on the Christian just war tradition, the one that most directly relates to the Lutheran context of my paper is Gary M. Simpson’s War, Peace, and God: Rethinking the Just–War Tradition. There is much in this book I find of interest and am in agreement with; I am even sympathetic with much that this book attempts to cover. However I have some very serious questions, both about his premise and the conclusions he draws vis-à-vis the continuing validity and application of his theory and the theological tools he applies to do this.

Where and Whence Just War ‘Tradition’?

Immediately after the introductory chapter, Simpson asks a rather broad question: “Why do Lutherans care about a two-thousand-year old tradition about war and peace?” This seemingly innocuous statement is very misleading on several levels. First, it is a perfect example of Western Christianity feeding only upon itself, without taking world Christianity into consideration, especially in those places where Christians are neither a cultural nor religious majority. In many cases, Christians in those places find themselves under persecution by the state and society, and for such Christians, it is difficult to ever consider this theory as either Christian or doctrinal in application.

Second, by referring to the just war tradition as a “two-thousand-year old tradition,” which he does in a few other places in this short text (see for example p. 26), he implicitly places it firmly in the realm of the life of Jesus Christ and thus in Scripture. For a Lutheran in particular, this is a very high claim, given the Lutheran importance on sola scriptura (Scripture alone). The high Reformation emphasis on sola scriptura is referred to as the ‘formal principle’ or the ‘Scripture principle’, and was central to the displacing of the power of the Roman Church in epistemic determinations. Not having any scriptural text to back the rather bold assertion (i.e., a two-thousand-year old tradition), which I think is a historical distortion, Simpson falls back on a generalized understanding of Christian tradition.

Simpson attempts to justify, wrongly I think, the high role of tradition in Lutheranism by saying that, “First, Lutherans pay careful attention to the strong convictions in Christian tradition, and we like to know what these convictions really mean”; and then conflates the Lutheran confessional premise with this notion of tradition by saying, “In fact, it is in being confessional that just-war tradition matters for us Lutherans.”
First of all, these statements place tradition as central in and for the theological and ethical epistemic task. This is clearly not a Protestant position, nor even a Lutheran position for that matter, in light of the latter's frontal critique of ecclesiastical authority, opinions and traditions as having equal footing with Scripture for developing or stating such epistemic normative references. Thus it seems that while Simpson openly confesses his Lutheranism, he ends up making the sort of Catholic epistemic argument that was so thoroughly rejected in the Reformation. Being unable to sustain a scriptural basis for just war tradition, he goes on to trace what he calls “Classical Footsteps of Just-War Tradition”—the title and content of chapter three of his book.

Classical Footsteps

The first Christian whom Simpson mentions in the context of his “two-thousand-year old tradition” is Ambrose of Milan (339–397 CE). It is perhaps somewhat ironic that Ambrose borrows his justification from Cicero, who was working in the context of the Roman Empire, rather than using a reference from Scripture, which, obviously, was written mostly by and for the victims of this particular empire. It is also important to note that the first Christian to make use of this Roman pagan tradition was writing shortly after the conversion of Constantine, and therefore must have been aware of one of the most sustained persecutions of the Christians by the Roman Empire between 303–313. Nevertheless, in setting forth his ideas about just war, he serves the now ostensibly Christian Roman Empire through this justification. There is no metanoia here, but only a validation.

The same applies to the third person in the quest for this justifying footprint, namely, Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE). Are we to believe that Augustine—following Ambrose, who follows Cicero, i.e. the second generation Christian usage of a pagan source from an empire that had threatened Christianity during the first three hundred years of its existence—can so thoroughly baptize these pagan roots as to make it a Christian tradition, even doctrine, if you please? It is interesting to note that while John Howard Yoder, on whose work Simpson seems quite dependent, makes a very careful statement about these two Church fathers’ position vis-à-vis just war theory by saying only that they “[a]ffirmed implicitly” this tradition, Simpson makes no such careful articulation but rather makes a case for almost unequivocal rootedness of this tradition in these two major church fathers.

In the Time of Jesus?

Second, in order to give this tradition a clearly false and longer historical pedigree, Simpson places the origins of this just war tradition in the time of Jesus and the earliest Christian community (i.e., a two-thousand-year old tradition), which is witnessed to in the New Testament. In this way, he provides the burden of sola scriptura and therefore gives it the status of being grundnorm for Protestants. So with a stroke of the pen he does away with three hundred plus years of Church history and tradition so that he can situate just war in a time and place where it acquires a normative status.

Simpson is not the creator of this approach but is simply following a long tradition of maintaining the status quo ante, even if it fundamentally violates some central Christian doctrines and principles. At the same time, those who take this approach feel the need to baptize these distortions so that they can act as legitimizers for the faith communities that follow. Simpson’s position affirms that we have totally and uncritically accepted this material and turned it into a Christian tradition. This has led to the usage of the just war tradition in the church both as a central affirmation and at times even as a doctrine. Is the claim that the just war tradition is Christian not simply a cover up making a high moral statement to justify the imperial morality first for Rome and now for the United States?

Rules of Engagement

The evolution of this tradition of the church also has led to a just war theory in the West that is not
restricted only to theological discussion but also extends to political and social discourse. It has two distinct components, which together are considered the ‘laws of war’, providing a broad set of criteria that are consulted at two different points: first, before engaging in war, in order to determine whether entering into war is justifiable; and second, during the conduct of war itself, in order to determine whether one’s practices during the course of a war are justifiable. These are given the following names:

1. *Jus ad bellum* (Latin for ‘justice to war’) are laws that judge whether or not it is acceptable to wage war and to use armed force.
2. *Jus in bello* (Latin for ‘justice in war’) are laws that determine whether or not such a war is conducted justly.

Several lists are generated to cover the various elements in each of the two distinct components, and there is no single, normative list that can be used as a universal standard. There have been many additions and deletions—dare I say evolutions—on the basis of changing political order (say from absolute monarchy to parliamentary monarchy to hard democracy), and changing needs of the status quo ante.

*Jus ad bellum* is defined by the following criteria:

1. War must be declared by a legitimate authority.
2. War must be in self-defense.
3. War must have as its aim the restoration of a just peace.
4. War must be chosen only as a last resort.
5. There must be a fair probability of success.9

*Jus in bello* states that:

1. War must be fought with proportionate means (the destruction expected should not outweigh the good to be obtained).
2. War must be fought out of love for the enemy.
3. War must be fought with minimum force.
4. Noncombatants may not be attacked.10

It must be remembered that Crusades and Holy Wars were not considered as part of the just war theory. According to different scholars there are various reasons behind such exclusion. According to C.S. Song what moved the crusaders was “love of adventure, hope of plunder, desire for territorial expansion, and religious hatred [towards Muslims].”11 In this sense, it has been argued, and I agree, that colonization is the “modern continuation of the Crusades.”12

### Jihad as Internal Struggle and Holy War

The concept and doctrine of jihad is central for Muslims. In recent years it has become one of the most frequently used terms by the Islamists who see jihad (holy struggle), along with sharia (Islamic law), and ummah (Islamic catholic community), as an indispensable triad for the regeneration of Islamic faith and the Muslim community. Although it does not have any official status in Sunni Islam as such, jihad is given a very central position, and it is sometimes even referred to as the sixth pillar of Islam.13 In the mainline (twelve imami) Shi’a Islam, however, jihad is one of the ten central practices of the religion.

### The Inaccuracy of the Term ‘Holy War’

Jihad is perhaps the most recognizable Muslim word to most in the West. The precise meaning of the word, however, escapes us, and is indeed hard to explain without nuance. It is therefore usually translated flatly, and inaccurately, as ‘holy war’. This is the popular image of jihad that pervades our news media, thus satisfying our need for Islamophobic propaganda. This image, however, also meets the needs of the Islamists for their own propaganda and recruitment. Reuven Firestone, however, rightly points out—without any apologetic purpose—that in fact,

The semantic meaning of the Arabic term *jihad* has no relation to holy war or even war in general. It derives, rather from the root *j.h.d.*, the meaning of which is to strive, exert oneself, or to take extraordinary pains. *Jihad* is a verbal noun of the third form of the root verb *jahada*, which is defined
classically as ‘exerting one’s utmost power, efforts, endeavors, or ability in contending with an object of disapprobation’.

In addition, Rudolph Peters states that,

The word has a basic connotation of an endeavour towards a praiseworthy aim. In a religious context it may express a struggle against one’s evil inclinations or an exertion for the sake of Islam and umma... working for the moral betterment of Islamic society ('jihad of the tongue' and 'jihad of the pen').

There has been a vibrant and robust discussion within Islam itself as to the meaning and role of jihad. There are two main understandings of jihad, and the one that has become the more prevalent in modern usage is in fact the secondary meaning at best.

Muslim thinkers... often differentiate between the 'greater jihād' (al-jihād al-akbar) and the 'lesser jihād' (al-jihād al-aṣghar), with the former representing the struggle against the self and only the 'lesser jihād' referring to warring in the path of God. Even within its range of meaning as war on behalf of Islam, the term is often used in relation to conflicts between Muslims.

Nevertheless, it must be stated clearly that jihad also reflects military aspects in Islam. However, war is to be fought only in the name of justice or Islam, to deter an aggressor, for self defense, and/or to establish justice and freedom to practice religion.

The Role of the Qur’an

For Muslims, the Qur’an is the primary and the most fundamental source of Islamic jurisprudence. It is the repository of faith as the Word of God (logos tou theou). The Qur’an, unlike the Bible, is not a chronological history of God’s people to be read from cover to cover. It is a source of guidance for Muslims with historical references as proofs of God’s action on behalf of humanity. In addition, the Qur’an itself states that it serves as a correction to, and fulfillment of, the Torah and the New Testament. Thus it is from the Qur’an that the main understanding of the concept of jihad is found.

Four Interpretations of the ‘Lesser’ Jihad

There are four different understandings of this lesser jihad in the Qur’an as it is read, studied and applied by Muslims:

1. Non-confrontation: the Prophet was commanded to spread the message of Allah and Islam peacefully and to avoid direct confrontation with the unbelievers. “So [Prophet] bear with them {those who have rejected God’s message} graciously,” (Q 15:85b) and “So proclaim openly what you have been commanded [to say], and ignore the idolaters” (Q 15:94).

2. Argumentation: Allah enjoined the Prophet to confront the unbelievers by means of argumentation. “[Prophet], call people to the way of your Lord with wisdom and beautiful teaching. Argue with them in the most courteous way, for your Lord knows best who has strayed from His way and who is rightly guided” (Q 16:125).

3. Confrontation within defined limitations: Allah granted permission to the Prophet and his followers to fight their enemies if they had been wronged and if aggression had been committed against them—within certain prescribed confines. “Those who have been attacked are permitted to take up arms because they have been wronged—God has the power to help them—those who have been driven unjustly from their homes only for saying, ‘Our Lord is God’. If God did not repel some people by means of others, many monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, where God’s name is much invoked, would have been destroyed. God is sure to help those who help his cause—God is strong and mighty” (Q 22:39–40);

4. Unconditional command to fight all unbelievers: “... wherever you find the polytheists, kill them,
seize them, besiege them, ambush them—but if they turn [to God], maintain the prayer and pay the prescribed alms, let them go on their way, for God is most forgiving and merciful.” (Q 9:5).  

Classical Muslim jurists like Shamseddin al-Sarakhsi (c. 1010–1090) argued that these four understandings of jihad represent a developing tradition within the Qur’an, progressing from a stance of non-violence to the unconditional command to fight the unbelievers. The problem with this approach is that classical Muslim scholars had no definitive way of knowing which verses were revealed earlier and which later, so the tradition of abrogation cannot be applied to these four approaches and none can claim to have priority on the basis of the date of revelation.  

The Greater Jihad as a ‘Striving for Good’

Muslims in general translate jihad as a sincere and noticeable effort for good—an unselfish striving for spiritual good. Jihad also includes the striving and establishing of justice. But before striving for community justice, an individual must hold justice as a primary religious and moral principle. “Strive hard for God as is His due,” the Qur’an commands in Q 22:78a. So the Qur’an here seems to incite all to strive in the cause of God. The cause of God is justice and freedom for all, keeping the Qur’anic principle of “no compulsion in religion” (2:256) on top of the list.

The greater jihad (al-jihad al-akbar) is the internal jihad, according to Islamic scholars. Muhammad is reported to have told warriors that they had returned from the lesser jihad and now must struggle against lust (symbolizing the greater jihad). It is believed that this hadith is of questionable origin, but in any case, it can be concluded that the internal jihad is supported by the Qur’an. The idea of the greater jihad is the struggle against one’s soul, as opposed to the lesser jihad, which is the concept of external or physical effort that often implies fighting. The struggle for the cause of God can be divided into five categories:

1. jihad of the heart
2. jihad by the tongue
3. jihad by knowledge
4. jihad by the hand
5. jihad by the sword

Each of these struggles is important in the overall concept of jihad in the Islamic world.

Jihad of the heart is an internal struggle of good versus evil. Jihad by the tongue is the struggle of good versus evil in the spoken word—it is in sermons and the prophetic word. This can be a strong weapon. Jihad by knowledge is the ongoing struggle of scholars. It is present in legal processes and also in medicine. Jihad by the hand involves struggle of one’s actions; it may also have to do with how one allocates money. This struggle can indicate one’s views of what is important in one’s life. Finally, jihad by the sword directly relates to holy war, fighting for God. The common theme in each of these forms of jihad is the struggle between good and evil.

An Alternative Reading

According to Reuven Firestone, who proposes “a new reading” of the Qur’an, there is a different four-fold grouping of jihad in the Qur’an. The first group of verses comprises those that express a non-militant means of propagating or defending the faith. Of particular importance here are the references to other “people of the Book,” for example Q 29:46, which states, “[Believers], argue only in the best way with the People of the Book, except with those of them who act unjustly. Say, ‘We believe in what was revealed to us and in what was revealed to you; our God and your God are one [and the same]; we are devoted to Him.”

A second group comprises those verses that express restrictions on actual fighting, such as “Fight in God’s cause against those who fight you, but do not overstep the limits: God does not love those who overstep the limits” (Q 2:190).

The greatest number of verses falls within the third group, the conflict between God’s command and the response of the people, for example, “Fighting is ordained for you, though you dislike it. You
may dislike something although it is good for you, or like something although it is bad for you: God knows and you do not” (Q 2:216). However, within this same category there are several other passages that suggest a tension within the early Muslim community over issues related to raiding and warfare (c.f. Q 3:156: “You who believe, do not be like those who disbelieved and said of their brothers who went out on a journey or a raid, ‘If only they had stayed with us they would not have died or been killed,’ for God will make such thoughts a source of anguish in their hearts. It is God who gives life and death; God sees everything you do.”)

Finally, there is the group of verses that strongly advocate war for God’s religion. Thus Q 2:191 is one of the passages frequently cited by radical Islamists seeking to justify attacking non-Muslims to establish a caliphate: “Kill them wherever you encounter them, and drive them out from where they drove you out, for persecution is more serious than killing. Do not fight them at the Sacred Mosque unless they fight you there. If they do fight you, kill them—this is what such disbelievers deserve.”

In the nineteenth century Cheragh Ali pointed out thirty-five occurrences of the word jihad or its equivalent in the Qur’an. There are just four verses that use derivations from jihad and are clearly ‘warlike’ in intention, or that, given the context, are open principally to a ‘warlike’ interpretation. In contrast, there are eleven verses that are pacific in intent or seem to be open principally to a pacific interpretation. Twenty of the verses are capable of different interpretations; they are open to a pacific reading, but they also could be read as having ‘warlike’ intent. In addition there are a number of verses (Q 2:190–3; 8:59–70; 9:5, 12, 30, 38–39 and 6:14) regularly cited by radical Islamists to justify attacking non-Muslims in order to establish caliphate.

The Role of the ‘Verses of the Sword’

As a matter of fact, the status of the “verses of the sword” (particularly Q 9:5 and 36) and whether they abrogate other statements in the Qur’an, stands at the center of the present issue in interpreting jihad. Muhammad Asad (1900–1992), one of the modern theological scholars of the Qur’an, argues that only a war of self-defense in the broadest sense can be considered a war “in God’s cause”; and that “this early, fundamental principle of self-defense” is maintained throughout the Qur’an, as is evident from Q 2:190 and 22:39–40. Q 9:5 (“the verse of the sword”) reads:

When the [four] forbidden months are over, wherever you find the polytheists, kill them, seize them, besiege them, ambush them—but if they turn [to God], maintain the prayer and pay the prescribed alms, let them go on their way. For God is most forgiving and merciful.

Asad contends that it should be read in conjunction with the two preceding verses, as well as with Q 2:190–4:

Fight in God’s cause against those who fight you, but do not overstep the limits: God does not love those who overstep the limits. Kill them wherever you encounter them, and drive them out from where they drove you out, for persecution is more serious than killing. Do not fight them at the Sacred Mosque unless they fight you there. If they do fight you, kill them—this is what such disbelievers deserve—but if they stop, then God is most forgiving and merciful. Fight them until there is no more persecution, and your worship is devoted to God. If they cease hostilities, there can be no further hostility, except towards aggressors. A sacred month for a sacred month: violation of sanctity calls for fair retribution. So if anyone commits aggression against you, attack him as he attacked you, but be mindful of God, and know that He is with those who are mindful of Him.

Asad argues that these verses relate to warfare already in progress with people who have become guilty of a breach of treaty obligation and of aggression. He thus concludes that “every verse of the Qur’an must be read and interpreted against the background of the Qur’an as a whole.” Therefore, there is absolutely no implication of any well established and defined political theory vis-à-vis jihad in the Qur’an. The Qur’an nowhere demands that the Muslims should remain permanently at war with the non-believers. The struggle is to be done by da’wah (persuasion, preaching, invitation); moreover, resorting to force is allowed only as a
The concept of jihad in Islam has evolved and changed. In the original Arabic it simply means to strive, or struggle in the way of God. Unfortunately, today the concept of jihad is being manipulated by both the West and the Islamists to mean fighting a war in God’s name. The fact that jihad is present in Islam from its earliest days and an important theme in the Qur’an is both a strength, providing a highly developed early source for political and social contexts, but also a weakness, enabling Salafi and jihadist Muslims to use the high concept of jihad along with shar’iah and ummah, as a rallying point and justification for their political stance.

Endnotes

1. Thomas Aquinas, who was sent to Paris for his studies, encountered Greek philosophy through the school of Avicenna (Ibn Sīna) and Averroes (Ibn Rushd). Going against both the Greek and Muslim philosophers he wrote the Summa de veritate chatholicae fide contra gentiles, commonly known as Summa Contra Gentiles, before he ever broached his more renowned Summa Theologica. On the basis of considerable evidence it can easily be argued that some of the central epistemological and hermeneutical contributions of Aquinas were deeply influenced by Islam.

2. For this summary I am indebted to John Howard Yoder, When War is Unjust: Being Honest in Just-War Thinking (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1996). An earlier edition was published by Augsburg Publishing House (Minneapolis, 1984). Both these texts have an introduction by Charles P. Lutz who was the Director of Church and Society of the American Lutheran Church when the first edition was published, and was the editor of Metro Lutheran during the publication of the second edition; this is only to show the close Lutheran connection to this publication.


4. Ibid., 15, emphasis mine.

5. Ibid., 15, emphasis mine.

6. Ibid., 16.

7. In this, Simpson follows Charles Lutz’ positions in the two introductions mentioned in footnote 1 above.

8. See Yoder, ibid., 1.

9. To this traditional list jus ad bellum Simpson also adds the following but not in the order below:
   - When it is in response to the perpetration of a real injury (just cause);
   - When the legitimate authority prosecuting the war has righteous intentions (right intention);
   - When the overall damage caused by war will not exceed the original injury suffered (proportionality of ends);
   - When there is a public declaration of the reasons for waging war (public declaration).


13. Sunnism recognizes five pillars of Islam, namely, 1. Shahada, or the creedal confession that “I bear witness that there is no God but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah”; 2. Salat, or ritual prayer performed five times a day; 3. Zakat, or almsgiving; 4. Sawm, or fasting during the month of Ramadan; and 5. Hajj, or pilgrimage to the Kaaba.


17. This, and all subsequent quotations from the Qur’an were taken from M.A.S. Abdel Haleem, The Qur’an: A New Translation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).


19. Ibid., 27.


22. Muhammad Asad, The Message of the Qur’an (Gibraltar: Dar Al-Andalus, 1980), as quoted in Bonney, 29.
